Pointing combined with verbal referring is one of the most paradigmatic human multimodal behaviours. The aim of this paper is foundational: to uncover the central notions that are required for a computational model of multimodal referring acts that include a pointing gesture. The paper draws on existing work on the generation of referring expressions and shows that in order to extend that work with pointing, the notion of salience needs to play a pivotal role. The paper starts by investigating the role of salience in the generation of referring expressions and introduces a distinction between two opposing approaches: salience-first and salience-last accounts. The paper then argues that these differ not only in computational efficiency, as has been pointed out previously, but also lead to incompatible empirical predictions. The second half of the paper shows how a saliencefirst account nicely meshes with a range of existing empirical findings on multimodal reference. A novel account of the circumstances under which speakers choose to point is proposed that directly links salience with pointing. Finally, this account is placed within a multi-dimensional model of salience for multimodal reference.
INTRODUCTION
Researchers on human pointing gestures have for a long time observed that pointing is essentially a means to "reorient the attention of another person so that an object becomes the shared focus of attention" (Butterworth [2] ). In Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. other words, pointing can be viewed as one way to change the salience of an object.
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1 Somewhat surprisingly, this insight does not seem to have had any counterpart in computational models for generating multimodal referring expressions. These accounts do not feature the notion of salience and typically treat pointing as a fallback strategy. For example, Lester et al. [11] proposes to only use a pointing act, if a pronoun doesn't suffice to identify the target, and Claassen [4] introduces an algorithm which only uses pointing if no purely verbal means of identification is possible. Similarly, Van der Sluis and Krahmer [16] describe an algorithm that only uses a pointing act if a purely verbal referring act becomes too complex. More recently, Krahmer and Van der Sluis [10] describe an algorithm for multimodal reference that does not view pointing as a fallback strategy. Their algorithm assigns costs to the properties that are included in a referring expression. Pointing is modelled as just another property: a pointing act identifies a subset of objects in the domain. A graph-based algorithm is employed to find the cheapest combination of properties for referring to an object. But again, salience plays no role in this account. Also accounts of the interpretation of multimodal referring acts have typically not related salience with pointing; e.g., Choumane and Siroux [3] , who do model visual salience, view pointing acts strictly as designating an object.
The aim of this paper is to unpick the relation between salience and pointing and lay the foundations for a computational account. The starting point is another look at the role of salience in the generation of referring expressions. I will distinguish between two opposing approaches for dealing with salience: salience-first and salience-last accounts, and argue that these differ not only in computational efficiency, as has been pointed out previously, but also lead to different empirical predictions. The second half of the paper shows how a salience-first account nicely meshes with a range of existing empirical findings on multimodal reference. I propose 1 Salience is used here in a very broad sense, following, for example, Theune [14] and Krahmer and Theune [9] . An object can be salient because it has been pointed at, referred to, or also, for instance, because of its colour (which may be different from the objects around it) or its size. Some may prefer to replace the term 'salience' with 'accessibility', e.g., as defined on Page 699 of Kahneman [7] : "[...] accessibilitythe ease (or effort) with which particular mental contents come to mind. The accessibility of a thought is determined jointly by the characteristics of the cognitive mechanisms that produce it and by the characteristics of the stimuli and events that evoke it. [...] the determinants of accessibility subsume the notions of stimulus salience, selective attention, specific training, associative activation, and priming." a novel account of the circumstances under which speakers point that directly links salience with pointing. Finally, I introduce a multi-dimensional model of salience.
SALIENCE: FIRST OR LAST?
Throughout this paper, Dale and Reiter's [5] incremental algorithm (IA) is used as a starting point. The IA works on the assumption that there is a universe or domain of objects U which includes a target r, the object the speaker intends to refer to. In order to refer to r, the speaker constructs a description D which expresses a set of properties P1, . . . , Pn such that the intersection of these properties equals {r}. In other words, the description is such that it uniquely identifies r. Each property is treated extensionally 2 as a subset of U and properties are organized as belonging to attributes (e.g., the properties red, green, . . . are associated with the attribute colour). Attributes are ordered, where the ordering indicates which attributes are preferred for constructing a description.
The algorithm works as follows: it starts with the empty description D = ∅ and a context set C which is initialized with the domain: C = U, and iterates through the ordered list of attributes. The algorithm fails if the end of the list is reached. On each iteration, the following steps are taken:
1. The best property P belonging to the current attribute is selected, i.e., the property P which has the smallest non-empty intersection with C and includes r.
2. If C −P = ∅ (where C −P stands for the set of objects in C that are ruled out by P ), then:
return D, unless D includes no property from the topranked attribute, in which case add an appropriate property from this attribute to D and return the result.
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There are two principal ways to add salience to this account. They can be compared most easily by assuming that salience S r is a property, i.e., a subset of U that can be computed if we know the salience value of each of the objects in U and the identity of the target r: Sr, the salience property for r, is the set of objects whose salience value is above some threshold value which is defined as the salience value of r minus a confidence interval (see Figure 1) .
Note that at this point we remain agnostic about how individual salience values are computed. We address this issue in Section 4.
In salience-first accounts, IA is started by initializing C with Sr(⊆ U ) instead of U: the idea is to find a description which distinguishes r from the objects in U that, given a confidence interval, are at least as salient as r itself. Alternatively, salience-last accounts modify iteration step 3: the condition C = {r} is replaced by C ∩ Sr = {r}. Thus, at the end of each iteration it is checked whether r is the most salient object which fits the description D. Whereas, for example, Theune [14] and Van Deemter and Krahmer [15] propose essentially salience-first accounts, Kelleher et al. [8] and Krahmer and Theune [9] describe salience-last algorithms. The former point out that their approaches are to be preferred on computational grounds; by removing from U all objects that are not a member of S r , the algorithm, at each step, has to inspect a smaller C than in any salience-last approach. A further possible reason for preferring saliencefirst is its cognitive plausibility (Van Deemter and Krahmer mention its 'naturalness', though they do not expand on this). Here, we draw attention to a novel observation: salience-first and salience-last accounts lead to different empirical predictions.
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Figure 2: A domain with several triangles. The set of triangles enclosed by the box is the salience property Sr for r Consider Figure 2 and let us assume that the attributes are ordered as follows: shape, colour, size. 4 The saliencefirst approach results in D = {big, triangle}: C is restricted to the set of salient objects (the ones within the enclosed area). Since all objects are triangles, on the first iteration no property is added to D. On the second iteration, no property is added either (since all salient objects have the same colour). On the third and final iteration, the property big is added which distinguishes r from the other objects in C. Finally, D ∪{triangle} is returned, which can be realized as for example 'the big triangle'. Salience-last, in contrast, results in D = {black, big, triangle}. This is a consequence of the fact that in the second iteration, the test on whether to include black is: a) Does it include r? Yes. b) Does it rule out any objects from U (rather than S r (⊆ U ))? Yes, the two white triangles.
WHEN TO POINT?
In contrast with the accounts of pointing discussed in Section 1, here we put forward a model for multimodal reference which establishes a direct link between pointing and salience, and more specifically salience-first accounts. The basic ingredients of this approach are:
1. Pointing is a way of making the set of objects that have been pointed at maximally salient.
2. Assuming that the target r is a member of the set of objects that the speaker pointed at, the pointing act causes Sr to be identical with the set of objects that the speaker pointed at.
3. In accordance with the salience-first version of the Incremental Algorithm, Sr (the salience property for r) is used to initialise the context set C, and a description is generated relative to this set.
This tells us what the effect of pointing is. We propose that the decision when to point is captured by the following rule:
Salience-based pointing rule: If, as a result of pointing, the size of the context set C = S r for target r can be reduced, then point.
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This account is grounded in the following empirical findings:
1. The decision whether to point is correlated with the salience of the target: pointing is preferred when the target is not salient, i.e., when Sr is big relative to the domain U (Piwek [13] ).
2. When the target is pointed at, on average the number of properties used in the description is smaller (Piwek [13] ).
3. Levelt et al. [12] and De Ruiter [6] found that the onset of pointing gestures precedes their spoken affiliates. This is compatible with the model proposed here, where a speaker first decides whether to point and then constructs a verbal description.
Let us compare this approach with the one based on costs advocated by Krahmer and Van der Sluis [10] (see Section 1). Consider Figure 3 . Using the cost assignments provided in [10] , we can calculate that the optimal description of the target r is 'the small black triangle' (cost 2.25). This description is cheaper than 'this triangle' + pointing (cost 3). Here we have a small S r to start with, and pointing may not help from where the speaker is standing: assuming the speaker remains stationary, s/he may only be able to point at a set of objects that is equal to or bigger than S r . The cost-based model ignores these considerations.
DIMENSIONS OF SALIENCE
So far we have not dealt with the detail of how to compute the salience values that determine Sr. We have suggested that pointing can change salience values. Also, there is ample literature on how verbal reference affects salience. Usually the idea is that the more recent an object was referred to, the more salient it is. In a visually shared domain, spatial relations between objects can also influence salience. In particular, an object that is salient directs attention to itself and the spatial region around it. Consequently, the salience of the objects in its vicinity get a boost -here we will call this implied spatial salience. Beun and Cremers [1] have found that speakers exploit spatially implied salience in that they usually produce (first-mention) descriptions that only distinguish the target from the most salient object and objects that are spatially implied by (i.e., close to) it.
For each of the aforementioned types of salience, we propose to introduce a separate dimension modelled as a function: p (pointing dimension), v (verbal reference dimension) and i (implied spatial dimension). Each function, when applied to a specific object x returns an integer from [0 − 10]. We also define the aggregate salience value of an object as: Here, †(x) ⇔ x is referred to between S − 1 and S. The equations can be seen at work in Figure 4 . This figure depicts a sequence of states for a universe of two objects, d 1 and d 2 . Although in this model states are temporally ordered, transitions between states can take place in parallel, as long as a transition to a later state is never completed before the transitions to the states preceeding.
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